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Abstract First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic
conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more
than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view
of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of
these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and
that it better accommodates the phenomenon of inconsistent scientific theories.
Keywords Semantic conception of scientific theories · Inconsistent theories ·
Formal languages · Scientific theories as models · Bridge principles
1 Introduction
I first present two “received views” of scientific theories. Both views can be character-
ized in terms of Tarski’s (1983) semantics for logical formalisms.1 For concreteness,
consider a first-order language Lan with an unspecified number of nonlogical constants
and predicates. Theories are collections of sentences of Lan. A domain O is a set of
objects. In standard presentations of model theory, a model of a first-order language
Lan is a pair (O, M), where O is a domain, and M is a mapping of the nonlogical
constants of Lan to elements of O and the nonlogical n-place predicates of Lan to
n-relations of the elements of O.
Given a Tarskian recursive definition of truth-in-a-model, we can characterize sci-
entific theories in two possible ways: as formal theories (sets of formalized sentences)
1 The semantic conception self-consciously arises from Tarski’s work. Theory-centered views officially
predate Tarskian semantics but (as I show) are easily accommodated in its framework.
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or as collections of models (set theoretic, or otherwise). Proponents of (earlier) theory-
centered approaches often describe a scientific theory as a set of laws L from which
the remaining sentences of that scientific theory deductively follow. Any such set of
laws has a family of models that it’s Tarski-true in. One—or several—of these are the
intended models of the scientific theory. Sometimes the intended models are taken to
be characterized by correspondence rules that map the nonlogical vocabulary to items
in the world.
A broader more flexible way of characterizing a range of intended models in
theory-centered approaches is by parameters. These are specified nonlogical con-
stants and relations that are empirically fixed (e.g., numerically: the fundamental
constants of physics; or ontologically: as referring to this or that item or relation
or to any such in a specified class). Further flexibility is achieved by treating a scien-
tific theory as containing law-schemata instead of lawful sentences (with or without
parameters).2
It might be thought that even more flexibility is introduced if the theories in question
are allowed additional resources by deserting the first-order framework altogether—
by allowing theories to be couched in higher-order logics, for example. It might even
be argued that scientific theories and mathematical theories themselves are already
higher-order formalisms that clearly involve quantification into predicate positions—
and that this is the way to understand informal-rigorous mathematical characterizations
of well-ordering, for example.3
In response, I should first point out that the increase in expressive power the intro-
duction of higher-order logics apparently brings is spurious—that it does not go beyond
the actual representational capacities of theories in first-order languages. See footnote
12 below for indications for why this is true and for references. Second, as I will
indicate towards the end of Sect. 2, it’s a mistake to characterize scientific and mathe-
matical theories—as they occur in ordinary mathematical and scientific practice—as
formalisms, either first-order, higher-order, or whatever. Rather, they are written in
natural languages supplemented with additional technical vocabulary. It is, therefore,
a theoretical reconstrual of scientific theories (a more or less justified theoretical recon-
strual) to characterize them as formalisms. This point will be important towards the
end of this paper. Regardless of these two points, nothing in theory-centered formaliza-
tion approaches to scientific theories requires first-order logic; and so readers should
understand the language of theories according to theory-centered approaches to be
open-ended with respect to the logic they presuppose. Thinking of them as so open-
ended will prove valuable when theory-centered approaches are compared to semantic
approaches in Sect. 2.
On some versions of theory-centered approaches, L is to characterize the laws
of everything (other than abstracta). On this attractively simple “unity of science”
picture, the domain of a scientific theory is everything—or everything fundamental—
and its nonlogical predicates correspond to the law-relevant relations of those objects.
Such a theory is false if it’s not Tarski-true in the world: if the (physical) items of
2 See (Kuhn, 1970, p. 188) and (Azzouni, 2004, pp. 18–19).
3 My thanks to the anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
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the world and their law-relevant relations isn’t one of its models. Inducing successor
scientific theories involves changing sentences from previous scientific theories with
consequent changes in the family of models of such theories.
Many opponents of theory-centered approaches don’t recognize the enormous flex-
ibility of such approaches, that (for example) a global realist-representational charac-
terization of scientific theories isn’t required by the mere assumption that scientific
theories are linguistic entities. For example, the domains of scientific theories—on
theory-centered views—needn’t contain everything that exists: domains can be small.
Although theory-centered approaches (for certain logical positivists) were understood
as programmatically characterizing a unified science with one (physical) domain,
theory-centered approaches are compatible with a very different picture: The sciences
are highly disunified and different sets of laws hold in different domains. Indeed, the
domains in question can either be physically disjoint from one another, or they can
instead be characterizations of a given phenomenon in terms of entities at different
levels of “grain.”4
Furthermore, although I initially described theory-centered approaches as attempt-
ing true descriptions of the items in the world—and concomitantly, as attempting
“realist” representations of what there is—that’s not required either. Theory-centered
approaches are compatible with anti-realism: the view that scientific theories aren’t
true but have other virtues, “approximate truth” or “predictive value,” etc.
Too many of the polemics directed against theory-centered views have focused
on subsidiary positions held by some of their adherents, or by philosophers labeled
vaguely as “logical positivists,” but that aren’t essential to theory-centered approaches.
Another example is this: Proponents of theory-centered approaches saw the applica-
tions of a scientific theory as arising by the logical deduction of consequences from
sets of laws. Where the application-area is characterized in a vocabulary different from
that of the laws themselves, they invoked bridge principles as providing the deductive
medium linking statements in the two vocabularies. Relatedly, they regarded a scien-
tific theory as deductively linked to the more specific theories that arise from it. This
deductivist perspective, however, isn’t required by the assumption that scientific theo-
ries are linguistic entities. Other ways—compatible with theory-centered views—are
available to explain how scientific theories are applied, and how scientific theories
relate to their specifications.5
Let’s turn now to the other received view.6 This second family of views—the seman-
tic conception—instead takes scientific theories to be collections of set-theoretical
models or (more vaguely) nonlinguistic structures of some sort.7 State spaces (Beth
4 For example, as persons or as cells or as collections of molecules.
5 I omit further discussion of deductivism. See Azzouni (2000, especially Part I).
6 There are many proponents, and so many versions, of semantic approaches. See Suppe (1989), Prologue,
for history, and Suppe (1989, 35, footnote 2) for references. Some proponents: Van Fraassen (1980), Suppe
(1989), Sneed (1971), Stegmüller (1976), Giere (2000); but there are many others. See Frisch (2005, 195,
footnote 2) for further references. The approach originates in Beth (1948).
7 That scientific theories are nonlinguistic entities is meant literally—at least by many although not all pro-
ponents of the semantic conception. Giere (Giere (1988, p. 85): “we understand a theory as comprising two
elements: (1) a population of models, and (2) various hypotheses linking those models with systems in the real
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and van Fraassen), or relational systems (Suppe) are some examples. Further, these
structures needn’t be purely mathematical but can either contain actual items from the
world (e.g., physical entities) or (more vaguely) “phenomena.” Where such a collec-
tion can be characterized as the models of a formal theory, of course, there doesn’t
seem to be any difference between taking a scientific theory to be that formal theory
and taking the scientific theory to instead be the models of that theory.8 But, some
have argued, such a collection of structures can’t be so characterized because the struc-
tures in question (although similar in vocabulary) can fail to be “axiomatizable”—that
is, there is no (recursive) characterization of the sentences true in all and only those
structures. I discuss this claim further in Sect. 2.
As noted, the semantic conception is credited with a flexibility and an accuracy
towards ordinary scientific practice that’s denied to theory-centered approaches.9 In
particular, proponents of the semantic conception claim (i) that the semantic approach
better fits the view (of scientists) that the scientific theories in any field are “tools” to
solve problems rather than true descriptions of the world and its laws. They also say (ii)
that scientists treat theories as “models” of a phenomenon, and that this practice is bet-
ter characterized by the “models” of the semantic conception than by anything linguis-
tic. Finally (iii), they sometimes claim that the individuation conditions for theories,
when construed linguistically and when construed model-theoretically, are different,
and that the individuation conditions for theories construed model-theoretically fit the
individuation conditions that scientists use better.10 I’ve already indicated reasons to
doubt (i) and (ii), but I discuss all three claims further in the following sections.
2 What do intended models show?
Van Fraassen (1985, pp. 301–302) and Van Fraassen (1989, pp. 210–213) defends
the semantic conception of theories against the claim that the distinction between
semantic and formalization approaches to such theories is “a distinction without a
difference.”11 He argues that scientific theories can be (and are) presented as sets of
models, but that this practice evades formalization because of the nonstandard models
of pertinent first-order theories. For example, if each of a set of models of some
Footnote 7 continued
world.” Suppe (1989, p. 3): “According to the Semantic Conception of Theories, scientific theories are
not linguistic entities, but rather are set-theoretic entities.” Stegmüller (Stegmüller (1978, p. 39): “Physical
theories are introduced as sets of ordered pairs, each pair consisting of a sequence of mathematical structures
and a class of domains of applications.” Van Fraassen (1989, p. 222): “if the theory as such, is to be identified
with anything at all—if theories are to be reified—then a theory should be identified with its class of models.”
Suppes (1967), however, doesn’t identify a scientific theory directly with a collection of models, and da
Costa and Da Costa and French (2003, pp. 33–34) offer a complex extrinsic/intrinsic picture with interplay
between viewing a scientific theory as a collection of models and viewing it as a linguistic characterization
of such a collection.
8 As noted by Friedman (1982).
9 Stegmüller (1976, Chap. 1) and Suppe (1989, Chap. 2), Nickles (2002) and Da Costa and French (2003).
10 Suppe (1989, p. 4) and Da Costa and French (2003, p. 24).
11 This charge occurs in Friedman (1982) and in Worrell (1984). I’m revisiting it, and sustaining it, against
Van Fraassen’s (1985), and Van Fraassen’s (1989) subsequent defense.
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phenomenon includes the real number continuum, any first-order formalization meant
to capture that set of models will also include nonstandard countable models. Against
the natural suggestion that a first-order formalization approach can be restricted to
the “intended” or “standard” models, Van Fraassen (1989, p. 212) denies that such
descriptive restrictions are available to “syntactic” approaches “except by fiat.”
What this defense relies on—as Van Fraassen (1989, pp. 210–213) , makes clear—
is the substantial claim that there are linguistic resources in natural languages for
fixing reference to intended models beyond what’s available in formal languages.
This issue arises rather directly in philosophy of mathematics. Several authors—e.g.,
Myhill (1951) and Pearce and Rantala (1982), among others—suggest that the apparent
ability of mathematicians to refer (only) to intended models is due to resources in
natural languages, but not in formal ones.
Van Fraassen (1989, p. 212) also claims that the resources in natural languages
can’t be captured by formalisms because “natural language consists in the resources
we have for playing many different possible language games,” resources that formal
languages presumably don’t have. This, however—even if right—merely raises an
issue. The intuitive impression (in informal mathematical practice) that one refers to
intended models makes acute the question of how one does this. Indeed, as I indicate
in the next two paragraphs, such reference in natural languages involves acts of “fiat”
that are identical in nature to what’s available to formalist approaches for reference.
For consider the case van Fraassen mentions, the “presentation” of intended col-
lections of uncountable models without the inclusion of countable ones. The data
is that ordinary practice “enables” this—routinely—by descriptions of the intended
models in the vernacular coupled with specialized vocabulary. But anything present in
ordinary language or available to its users that enables them to fix on intended models
either fails at this or can be similarly employed by users of formalized languages. If,
for example, it’s the intentions or other cognitive states of the mathematician/scientist
that enables such reference, these can similarly be enjoyed by users of formaliza-
tions. If there are specialized idioms in the vernacular with referential powers beyond
first-order idioms, then we can also invent formalizations using similar idioms. In
particular, if higher-order quantifiers occur in natural language that enable the formu-
lation of theories that don’t have the unintended models that first-order theories have,
then they can obviously be incorporated into formulations of scientific theories in a
way that’s compatible with theory-centered approaches.
Finally (and this exhausts the options), if it’s the meanings of mathematical terms
that force reference to intended models and not to other models, these too can be trans-
planted to a formal setting via “meaning postulates.” In short, one shouldn’t assume, as
van Fraassen does, that however it is that mathematicians and other scientists “present”
exactly the mathematical structures they want to present (and not other unintended
ones), it’s by (unexplicated) resources that elude formalization.12
12 Van Fraassen’s word “fiat” strikes exactly the right note with respect both to formalisms and to ordinary
language. I argue in my 1994, Part I, § 3, that the incorporation of any linguistic resources in a formalism
to enable the exclusion of unintended models relies on mere fiat to manage that magic. In other words,
resources that go beyond the first-order case in their referential strength involve forms of buried fiat to do
so. So the right conclusion isn’t that ordinary language has resources that formalisms lack; it’s that various
forms of buried fiat are doing the same job in ordinary language.
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Some proponents of the semantic conception think the general absence of formal-
izations from ordinary scientific practice supports their position. Suppe (1977, p. 221)
claims, for example, that because formalizations are rare in science, scientific theories
can’t be collections of propositions or statements, but must therefore be nonlinguistic.
All that really follows, of course, is the truism that the propositions or statements in
question are denizens of ordinary language (supplemented with specialized vocabu-
lary). It’s equally true that ordinary mathematics occurs in natural languages supple-
mented with specialized vocabulary, and not in a formalized setting. (See my 2009 (a),
and the other articles cited there.) It would be bizarre, however, to draw the conclu-
sion in the mathematical case that Suppe draws in the scientific case: that, therefore,
mathematical theories are extra-linguistic entities.
Given the foregoing, the immediate corollary is that the semantic conception can’t
involve anything distinctive that’s unavailable to theory-centered approaches. This is
because any presentation of a family of models must involve (theoretical) descriptions,
and that means that scientific theories can be always be identified with those (theoreti-
cal) descriptions instead of with the family of models those descriptions characterize.
It’s important to stress, however, the point just made that scientific theories aren’t de
facto formalisms but instead are linguistic entities of ordinary language supplemented
with a specialized vocabulary. This point deviates from both perspectives on scientific
theories that I initially described in Sect. 1. It’s also important to stress that this is
true not only of scientific theories but also of mathematical theories (as such theo-
ries occur in ordinary mathematical practice). Mathematical theories are written in
the vernacular augmented with additional technical vocabulary, and therefore it is a
reconstrual of them to characterize them either as first-order theories or as higher-order
theories.
Although these facts raise interesting and difficult questions both about the relation-
ship of scientific theories and mathematical theories to ordinary language and difficult
questions about their relationship to the formalisms that philosophers use to describe
them, nothing in the analysis of these questions yields anything that’s particularly
supportive of the semantic conception of scientific theories.
In Sect. 4 I will use the fact that scientific theories occur in the vernacular and
not as formalized theories to illuminate aspects of scientific practice with respect to
inconsistent theories. Meanwhile, however, I’ll return to defending the flexibility of
theory-centered views against their semantic conception competitors.
3 A new characterization of scientific theories
In order to address issue (iii), the claim that how scientific theories are individuated
according to theory-centered views doesn’t fit with how scientists individuate their
own theories, I first need to sketch a theory-centered view different from standard
ones.13
13 Previous discussions of my version of a theory-centered view of scientific theories occur in my 2004,
Chap. 2, and in my 2009 (b).
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For purely illustrative purposes, let’s again treat scientific theories as collections of
first-order sentences that scientific practitioners sometimes take to possess terms with
fixed interpretations, and sometimes to possess terms open to varying interpretation
(relative to a context of application).14 To begin with, the sentences of any scientific
theory contain constants and predicate expressions. Let c1, . . ., cm be the constants,
and P1, . . ., Pq the various n-place predicates, 1 ≤ m, q, of a scientific theory L . An
interpretation (O, M) of L is a model of the language of L , as in Sect. 1, except that—
generally—not all of the objects in the domain O are real. Thus, some—but generally
not all—of its constants c1, . . ., ci , 0 ≤ i ≤ n, are mapped by M to items in the world.
The rest of the constants are empty.15 Similar remarks apply to the n-place predicates.
I presuppose sentences with empty constants to nevertheless have truth values. The
notion of “truth” in play, therefore, is deflationist, and not a “correspondence” one.
More accurately, the presupposed notion of “truth” is compatible with correspondence,
but only when all the constants in a sentence are nonempty. I refer the interested reader
to other work for further details and arguments.16
In any case, most of the theories scientists use are recognizably false of the domains
they are applied to. That is, not all of the implications of such theories are true. Consider
TH, the set of implications of some scientific theory L . What makes L valuable, with
respect to an interpretation, are (some of) its true implications. These true implications
are singled out by description, so that a scientist, when utilizing a scientific theory,
commits herself only to the truth of the useful implications of L (and not to the rest
of it).
A toy example. Consider Ptolemaic astronomy (Pt). Imagine that the constants of Pt
are interpreted as referring to the planets, the luminaries, various geometrical objects,
etc. Pt also has predicates interpreted as characterizing positions of moving bodies,
classes of mathematical functions, etc. The constants that refer to the various planets
are nonempty; most of the other constants are empty. In addition, Pt is false: it doesn’t
describe the real locations of bodies. However, the apparent-location consequences
of Pt (as projected onto a celestial sphere from the vantage point of the Earth) are true
of those bodies, and it’s those consequences that make Pt valuable.17
14 Treating scientific theories as linguistic entities doesn’t exclude their being abstracta (types), e.g., ordered
types that contain the objects and relations they are about (i.e., “Russellian” propositions). It also doesn’t
exclude an individuation of “sentences,” so that different syntactic types express the same “statement” as
in natural languages. My discussion is neutral about this.
15 In my view, no interpretation of a scientific theory has only nonempty constants. This is because most—if
not all—scientific theories have at least some constants that refer to mathematical entities. All such, on my
view, are empty: there is nothing real they refer to. Alternatively put, “refer,” when used with respect to
such constants, isn’t a genuinely relational word. “Not everything in the domain O is real” isn’t meant to
express a Meinongian position where the domain O is to contain both real and unreal entities. Rather, talk
of “domains” is (as it always is) a metaphor standing for a particular kind of (Tarskian) semantics with
truth-conditional relations posited between object-language terms and metalanguage terms. Just as certain
object-language terms are empty, so are the corresponding metalanguage terms. This is an ontologically-
neutral use of Tarskian semantics. See my 2004, 53–55, or my 2010, Chap. 5, for further discussion.
16 Azzouni (2006, 2010), forthcoming (a).
17 Many philosophers appeal to “approximate truth.” But it’s not needed. Here’s a sketch of the argument:
Any time “approximately true” characterizes a successful scientific theory, that theory can instead be char-
acterized as a false theory with certain true implications. Specifically, that a certain numerical implication
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The interpretation of Pt involves nonempty constants. We can say, therefore, that
certain implications of Pt—the apparent-location implications—are true of the entities
referred to by those nonempty constants. Many scientific theories are similarly true
of entities we think are real. Many others, however, aren’t. A scientific theory can
often be successfully applied to phenomena where, given how it’s interpreted, all of
the constants in the theory are empty. (There is nothing real in the application-area
corresponding to the entities in the domain of that theory.) For example, a successfully
applied scientific theory may refer, apart from mathematical entities, only to magnetic
monopoles, or to other virtual particles.
There is one last wrinkle. I’ve utilized the word “interpretation” to describe how
the references of the constants of a scientific theory may be fixed as referring to cer-
tain items in the world, and correspondingly, how its predicates can be fixed in the
relations they correspond to. What’s important to note now is that—and proponents of
the semantic conception have rightly stressed this—a scientific theory is often char-
acterized apart from any particular interpretation. This ubiquitous practice is evident
right from the beginning of one’s study of physics. A theory, characterized by a set
of Newtonian n-body equations, say, is developed in a purely mathematical manner.
It’s then applied in numerous cases. Sometimes, in an application, the constants of the
theory are interpreted as not being empty: e.g., as the Sun and Jupiter. Sometimes, in
an application, all the constants are empty: they refer only to various virtual particles
and purely mathematical entities. Regardless, in any case where a scientific theory
is applied successfully, it has useful true implications. What’s crucial to note in this
kind of case, however, is that the scientific theory is not individuated in terms of its
applications (or by how the references of its constants and predicates are fixed in these
applications). Rather, it’s understood that the “same” theory is applied in different
cases. It’s here that the scientist’s use of “model” to characterize the role of scientific
theories becomes natural. The application of the theory allows scientists to “model”
the phenomena in terms of the theory.
It’s important, however, not to reify “models.” Proponents of the semantic concep-
tion do exactly that: treat models—so described—as mathematical entities, and so
they assimilate this use of the word “model” to a quite different case where actual
physical models of something are made (e.g., physical models of proposed buildings).
The scientific use of the word “model” is natural because of the various simplifications
the applications of many scientific theories impose on an otherwise complex phenom-
enon, e.g., the interactions of physical entities being treated as the interactions of rigid
Footnote 17 continued
of a theory is “approximately true” can be characterized as the truth that a certain measured value is within
±n, for specified n. For example, where Newton’s laws are currently still applied, it’s not because those
laws are “approximately true,” but because those (false) laws have implications that are true tout court. The
technical fact crucial to this argument is that adjectival constructions modifying “true” (e.g., “approximately
true that so and so is such and such”) can be pushed through the truth predicate to modify instead the contents
following that predicate (e.g., “true that so and so is approximately such and such”).
It’s often overlooked, I think, that Newton’s laws not only imply precise numerical results in such and such
situations; but those very numerical results themselves imply (various) approximate numerical results that
are also implied by general relativity in such and such same situations. In this way, in general, some of the
implications of a succeeded theory can nevertheless be true (and not approximately true!) from the vantage
point of a successor theory because they are implied by that latter theory.
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bodies under simple force assumptions. My interpretation is that, in all these cases,
one or another scientific theory is applied to a phenomenon even though (and this is
crucial), the theory is actually false of the phenomenon. The reason for doing so is that
the theory in question yields a number of useful true implications when interpreted
as applying to that phenomenon. Imagining the “entities” of a theory independently
of its applications, however, invites thinking of it as a “model”—a kind of structural
object that has an independent existence, and the entities of which can be taken to
“represent” the machinations of the phenomena in a simplified way. But this way of
approaching theories has no content beyond a theory being interpreted to enable an
application that is successful precisely because it yields a number of true implications.
Let’s now turn to issue (iii), that theory-centered approaches to scientific theories
supposedly fail to individuate those theories as scientists do. I’ll leave aside the evident
point (in my favor) that the individuation of scientific theories is, in any case, a murky
one. There is no bright line that indicates why certain changes in a theory (or in its
application) incline practitioners to describe the result as a new theory, rather than as
a modified version of the same theory. Surely sociological factors play the major role
here.
Proponents of the semantic conception, however, regard theory-centered approaches
as badly off with respect to individuation, even apart from the above point. This is
because they take theory-centered approaches to require both that there be “corre-
spondence rules” that indicate what scientific terms refer to, and that the individuation
conditions of scientific theories be sensitive to those rules. Suppe (1989, p. 4) and Da
Costa and French (2003, p. 24) argue that since such correspondence rules must be
characterized in terms of “experimental procedures” and “measurement techniques,”
both of which change constantly, theory-centered views are saddled with the absurd
result that new scientific theories emerge from older ones just by the refinement of
measurement techniques.
The “theory-centered approaches” so attacked are “straw men.” Talk of “correspon-
dence rules,” in any case, is naïve. The correct idea, of course, is that the application-
areas of scientific theories need to be indicated in some way. Those (early) philosophers
who labored under the (false) impression of there being a sharp theory/observation
distinction thought that correspondence rules were needed to anchor a theory entirely
couched in non-observational vocabulary; otherwise nothing in the theory could indi-
cate how or where it’s to be applied. But there is no genuine issue here. Any scientific
theory—like any collection of sentences of ordinary language—has grammatically-
referring expressions. And there are two possibilities to consider, when the referring
expressions refer to real objects, and when they don’t. First case. Some of the referring
expressions of a theory are taken to be real objects. Then nothing like “correspondence
rules” arises, no more than with the words of ordinary life. Rather, one takes one’s
instruments, observations, and so on, to defeasibly describe truths related in various
ways to those objects, and those truths are then utilized directly with the theory itself.
This is the case regardless of whether the theory is taken to be true or false of the
objects that it’s applied to.18
18 Imagine that one has a certain theory about cows. One tries to confirm that theory by observing cows,
or by other (instrumental) ways of learning about cows. One may develop auxiliary theories about how
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Second case. A scientific theory is applied to a phenomenon even though none
of the entities referred to by terms in that theory occur in that phenomenon (e.g.,
continua in the case of materials). Here too, certain instrumental interventions and
other ways of gathering data will (defeasibly) be treated in terms of the theory—as
indicating that such and such is the case with the entities the theory posits. Perhaps
the phrase “correspondence rule” can be made to better apply here—but it gives the
false impression that the application of a scientific theory, even in this case, involves
some kind of rule. It’s hard to see what the rule could be. Rather, one imposes a
theory on the phenomenon in a certain way by provisionally interpreting various
instrumental events as indicating certain truths couched in the language of the the-
ory. One hopes that doing so will result in implications that predict phenomena. In
any case, it’s unreasonable to treat such interpretations as constitutive of the iden-
tity conditions of the scientific theory (when construed linguistically). In particular, a
theory-centered approach needn’t be hostile to the idea that some scientific theories
are to be individuated in a way that treats them as having a quite open-ended class of
applications.
It’s true that many early proponents of theory-centered approaches treated sci-
entific theories as fixed in their references, and that those philosophers thought
that scientific theories were designed only to truly describe something or other.
There can be no denying that some scientific theories do have that job (or at
least, have that job when so interpreted by scientists): adherents of the semantic
conception overlook this fact. But those adherents are right to stress that many
scientific theories have another job: not to describe a phenomenon truly, but to
be a tool that extracts truths from what’s otherwise an intractable area of study.
To this end, the semantic conception pictures scientific theories as collections
of (simplified) models of a phenomenon—a toolkit. This picture, however, over-
looks the (linguistic) material out of which the tools in this kit are actually con-
structed: language. The tools, that is, are false theories with true implications.
And it’s very important to realize that scientists think of these theories in just this
way.19
It’s an interesting question whether (nowadays) any scientific theory is regarded
as (defeasibly) true tout court. Various branches of Newtonian physics were certainly
once so regarded; but whether this is true of any contemporary physical theory may
well be doubted.20 In any case, even if we (collectively) regarded all our applicable
Footnote 18 continued
one observes cows (theories of vision), or one may not. The situation is no different even in physics. The
application of the instruments utilized in physics almost always involves one scientific theory or another—
but our ability to apply them often goes beyond any theory in various ways. See Azzouni (2000, Part I.) In
neither case, in ordinary life or in the sciences, are “correspondence rules” utilized.
19 Some scientific theories are treated both ways (although in different contexts). That is, the same syntactic
forms can be taken to be true tout court when applied to one kind of phenomenon, and can be treated as
tools that are false when applied to other phenomena.
20 Perhaps certain appropriately restricted physical theories are taken to be true tout court. This doesn’t
seem to be the case, however, with our two contemporary grand theories: general relativity and quantum
mechanics. The current search (among certain physicists) for a unified successor theory that can be applied
everywhere indicates this.
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scientific theories as false tout court that would still leave us with plenty of truths—it
would just be that access to such truths would have to come packaged in scientific
theories that were (as a whole) false.21
One last observation. Many philosophers have described cases where incompatible
assumptions are used to derive different aspects of the same phenomenon. Nickles
(2002, p. 3) notes of Ptolemaic astronomy that “the constructions used to predict the
size of the moon at a given time were incompatible with those used to predict its loca-
tion or its speed.” Cartwright (1983) discusses similar examples from contemporary
physics. These cases are easily handled in accordance with ordinary scientific beliefs
about the matter: that the theories (or specific “laws”) in question are false, but have
certain true implications. The true implications must be mutually compatible; but this
isn’t true of the false theories used to derive them.
4 Contradictory scientific theories
The foregoing discussion indicates that one reason some false scientific theories are
indispensable is because they can be exploited to extract needed true implications
(about a phenomena) that can’t be derived from a true theory, either because no true
theory with such implications is available, or because any true theory that would imply
these results isn’t computationally tractable, or requires empirical parameters that are
impossible to determine, etc. One derives implications from false scientific theories
according to any (truth-preserving) inference method that works and can be applied to
it. All that’s needed is a characterization that circumscribes the true implications, e.g.,
“all the implications of L about the strength of the magnetic field are true,” or “all the
implications of L about the second-order effects of such and such are true,” etc.
Scientific practice, however, reveals not only that indispensable theories known to
be false are ubiquitous, but that even theories known to be inconsistent are common.22
How and why are these useful for scientific practitioners? The why is easy: there is
often no consistent theory—not even a false one—available from which particular
valuable implications can be drawn. The how is the important question, especially
since in classical-logic settings an inconsistent set of sentences implies everything.
Second, there is an important puzzle about what practitioners take themselves to be
doing when they work with theories or collections of theories that they know to be
inconsistent. I’ve argued elsewhere that natural languages are trivially inconsistent23;
21 Further: even if all scientific theories were false, it wouldn’t be that low-level “phenomenological”
generalizations were the only truths we had. High-level generalizations of narrow scope (about highly
theoretical entities) would also be true. The primary difference between my view and Cartwright (1983) is
that she takes a theory as false if it isn’t empirically confirmed, whereas I think the indispensability of a
scientific statement (or theory) can suffice for our having to take it to be true—confirmation needn’t come
into it. See Azzouni (2009(b)).
22 A taste of the literature: Brown (1990, 1992); Frisch (2005); Meheus (2002a); Norton (2002); Smith
(1988). See the opening paragraph of Da Costa and French (2002) for a list of prominent scientific theories
that are taken to be contradictory.
23 In particular, I argue that natural languages obey a logic that is classical, and so the contradictions of
natural languages make them trivially inconsistent: Every statement in such languages is both true and false.
See Azzouni (2003, 2007).
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an important element of my description of how ordinary speakers navigate trivially
inconsistent languages, however, is that they are unaware natural languages are incon-
sistent. Science is different: practitioners often know that the theories they are working
within, or that they are applying together to a phenomenon, are inconsistent. So here are
two questions: first, how can inconsistent scientific theories be utilized in classical-
logic settings? Second, what attitudes do (or should) practitioners take towards the
inconsistent theories that they use?
Central to my answers to these questions is something stressed earlier in this
paper: scientific reasoning doesn’t occur in a formalism, but in natural languages sup-
plemented with specialized vocabulary—specifically, in mathematized frameworks
(which themselves occur in natural languages supplemented with specialized vocab-
ulary). Formal tools—i.e., rules of logic—are so far off the scientific stage that they
shouldn’t even be seen as implicitly used by practitioners.24 Instead, scientific prac-
titioners learn to extract valued implications from scientific theories piecemeal and
laboriously: by discovering techniques and recipes of inference that can only be applied
to scientific theories in specialized and highly restricted ways.25 These techniques and
recipes are often—but not always—content-rich: they involve recognized idealizations
of various sorts. Sometimes, however, they are computational “rules of thumb”—sheer
calculational devices for manipulating a mathematical formalism that cannot be math-
ematically justified (at a particular time).
For our purposes, the point is this: scientists don’t have a small toolkit of topic-
neutral logical tools (modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism, …) that they apply to
scientific theories to extract implications. That’s not how scientific inference works.
Rather, they have a large, and ever-growing body of topic-specific inference tools that
can be only be applied to theories restricted to such and such narrow forms (or under
such and such highly specialized conditions). That is, all such tools are local; they
are very specific in how they can be applied to a theory, and what they will yield as
a result. But the corollary that a contradictory theory can be used to derive valuable
true results—without leading to an explosion of trivia—follows almost immediately.
For even if one has ways of deriving contradictory results from a theory, it won’t
follow that one can’t apply very different ways of deriving implications from that very
same theory—ones that are useful and won’t yield contradictions. Indeed, exactly this
is routine in empirical science.26
24 I argue in my 2009 (a) that this is the case for mathematical practice: all the more so for scientific
reasoning.
25 In physical theories, the problem is that the mathematics used is implicationally intractable. Partial
differential equations are an excellent example of the kind of intractability I’m speaking of. Notice that the
intractability of scientific laws when so represented follows rather directly from the general mathematical
intractability of integration: that one can’t easily manipulate integrals to extract their various implications.
It’s no exaggeration to say that the intractability of physical theories is due primarily to various forms
of integration that are utilized. See Azzouni (2000, Part I) for discussion. It should be added, however,
that most of the sentences in natural languages are, in any case, implicationally intractable as well. One
has only started to grasp the magnitude of the problem when one realizes that the sentences of ordinary
language—unlike first-order sentences—“don’t wear their semantics on their syntactic sleeves.”
26 It’s common to describe scientific practitioners as “ignoring” the contradictions in their theories. Norton
(2002, p. 193) asks, “what justifies ignoring all but one preferred member of a set of conclusions derived
validly from postulates?” But this distorts the epistemic situation: the contradictions in such a theory may be
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The use I’m suggesting scientists put a contradictory scientific theory to is militantly
ad hoc. Use inferential tools on it that yield results that are valuable, and avoid using
inferential tools on it that yield false or contradictory results. The view also takes
users of such theories to have a purely instrumental view of known contradictory
theories: the theories themselves are false (because they’re contradictory), although
of course, the truths extracted from them are seen—obviously—as true. Compare
this instrumental view with other competing views of contradictory scientific theories
found in the literature. Norton (2002, pp. 193–194), for example, offers a “content
driven” approach. Practitioners are taken as treating a contradictory theory as either a
close approximation to a “corrected consistent theory,” (a successor theory) or as an
inconsistent theory from which some conclusions (or good approximations of them)
of the successor theory can be extracted. I don’t doubt that some uses of contradictory
theories fit this pattern.27 But it’s a subtle question about previous and contemporary
uses of contradictory theories whether all do.28
Why should we think that scientific practice would tolerate a purely instrumental
view of contradictory theories? The reason is related to why it tolerates the employment
of false theories. Contrary to a long philosophical tradition, logical implications of
scientific statements and theories are not epistemically transparent: they are very hard
to discover.29 If, therefore, a contradictory theory lends itself successfully to such a
process, scientists (who are often desperate for a way into an intractable situation) will
go for it. Given enough epistemic desperation, they will do so regardless of whether the
contradictory theory has any hope of approximating a successor theory, and regardless
of whether the reasoning applied to a contradictory theory to yield these results has
any hope of being transplanted to a consistent successor theory.30
The bottom line is that the instrumental value of a contradictory theory—like any
false theory—is judged by its empirical fruits.31 This means that such a theory can
be valuable even if there is no hope that it approximates—in any respectable sense—
Footnote 26 continued
revealed only when quite specific inferential techniques are applied to that theory to extract a contradiction.
Other inferential tools, meanwhile, when applied to that same theory, never expose it.
27 See, e.g., Smith (1988) on Bohr’s old quantum theory.
28 Norton (2002, p. 185) notes that “there is no shortage of general philosophical schemes which tolerate
logical inconsistency without anarchy. What is in short supply are good case studies that can reveal clearly
which of these schemes matches the actual practice of science.”
29 Slogan: Reason is not epistemically transparent. The historical reasons for the contrary view are complex.
There is the inheritance of an epistemic view of logic exemplified by the view that logical truths are trivial.
But there is also the widespread tendency, in the twentieth century and subsequently, to treat reasoning as
if it always occurs in formalisms, and indeed, in first-order formalisms.
30 What’s striking about cases where a rigorous mathematical foundation is supplied for earlier inconsistent
mathematical-physical inference practices (e.g., the infinitesimal calculus, the Dirac δ-function) is that
(usually) the earlier proof- and inference-practices don’t survive. It’s only the results that are—more or
less—preserved. This happens even when proof- and inference-practices with earlier concepts continue to
be used by practitioners “informally,” a pattern that is illustrated by the use of infinitesimal and δ-function
reasoning in contemporary physics.
31 Laymon (1988, p. 262), describing early analyses of the Michelson-Morley experiment that utilized
inconsistent assumptions, writes that “scientists were primarily interested in the computational conse-
quences of those assumptions regardless of the consistency of those assumptions.”
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a corrected noncontradictory theory. It’s more or less a truism, of course, that the
desired implications of a contradictory theory, being true, will transplant successfully
to some corrected noncontradictory theory or other. But this is an empty truism about
future scientific theories; any successor theory—if relevant—is expected to preserve
empirically ratified results.
There are a number of interesting attempts to codify the “logic” of scientific reason-
ing within contradictory theories.32 One can either impose a version of paraconsistency
or some other formalist approach that excludes triviality (e.g., reasoning from consis-
tent subsets of an inconsistent theory, or by the adoption of “inconsistency-adaptive
logics”). An instrumental interpretation of contradictory scientific theories, however,
has two advantages over any attempt to so codify the reasoning in contradictory set-
tings. There is, first, the hermeneutical point that the appropriate level of analysis of
reasoning in contradictory settings must take place on the “surface” of the language.
That is, the threat of triviality is deflected by the difficulty scientists have in extracting
any implications from scientific theories. Second, it’s clear that professionals who
reason in contradictory settings recognize those settings to be pathological: they often
describe their reasoning (and the reasoning of others in such settings) as sheerly com-
putational or as ad hoc, etc. On my view, not only are practitioners right about this;
we can also see why, nevertheless, the practice works.
This is related to an issue that’s come up in the literature, and it’s the second
question I mentioned at the beginning of this section: what attitudes do (and should)
practitioners take towards theories they recognize as inconsistent? Many philosophers
suggest that in using an inconsistent theory, scientists must adopt some form of belief-
commitment towards it, and to this end, artificial doxastic attitudes such as “as if
true,” “partial” or “non-adjunctive” beliefs or belief-acquisition processes are postu-
lated. The instrumental view I’m urging allows a much more natural attitude towards
inconsistent theories, one that’s exactly the same as that for false theories. These the-
ories aren’t true, one isn’t committed to their truth, and one doesn’t believe them.
This purely instrumental attitude towards an entire inconsistent theory is compatible,
as I’ve stressed, with positive beliefs towards (some but not all of the) implications
of such theories. First, recognizing an inconsistent theory to be instrumentally valu-
able but false allows one to nevertheless believe true the valuable implications one
can extract from that theory.33 Second, one can also—for other epistemic reasons—
believe some of the statements of the inconsistent theory itself to be true. A sloppy
way of speaking—on the part of practitioners—that can indicate this mix of beliefs is
to say that the (whole) theory is “approximately true.” Some philosophers have tried
to give content to this idea34; but I don’t see why it’s needed.
When an inconsistent theory is fundamental or important enough, however, scien-
tists are tempted to try to extract further representational content from it despite its
inconsistency, and apart from its useful true implications. They are tempted, that is,
32 See, e.g., the articles in 2002b, and especially the references therein.
33 Among these implications can be existential claims that one reads as ontologically committing, numerical
approximations that one takes to be true, as well as higher-level generalizations of various sorts.
34 Among them, Da Costa and French (2002). Also see Brown (1990) for objections to the kind of instru-
mentalist attitude towards whole inconsistent theories that I endorse.
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to read off from such a theory a metaphysical picture of its subject matter. Strictly
speaking, an inconsistent theory tells us nothing representational. But there are ways
around this: One can (1) try to predict the overall form of a consistent successor theory,
and give a representation in terms of this, one can (2) favor a consistent subset of the
inconsistent theory, and give a representation from that alone, or one can (3) embrace
one or another doctrine of the inconsistency of reality itself. Of course, especially
in cases where the theory is clearly valued for its computational yield, one can (4)
recognize ad hoc reasoning for what it is, and exclaim that no one understands what’s
going on, although it works.35
I have endorsed a sharp dichotomy: either belief in the truth of a (whole) theory, or
an instrumental attitude towards that theory—one compatible with belief in the truth
of some of its implications. I’ve denied the need for a belief in the “partial truth” of a
theory, except as metaphor for disbelief in a whole theory coupled with belief in some
of its implications. Central to my view is a principle I share with Smith (1988), one
that da Costa and French describe as “unacceptable(!)” (2002, 116, their punctuation):
Acceptance of the truth of a set of statements warrants their unrestricted use in all
reasoning processes.
Their objection is this: “no scientific theory, past or present, receives such warrant;
there are always hedging conditions, acknowledgments of limitations, approximations,
etc.” My response is this: if this is true, and if in all cases, these hedging conditions,
acknowledgments of limitations, uses of approximations, etc., are not recognized as
epistemic limitations to facilitate computational success, or as idealized reformulations
of the theory so that it’s easier to empirically apply, then no scientific theory, past or
present, has ever been regarded as true. It’s an historical question whether da Costa
and French are right about this. I think they’re not.36
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